China Concepts Stocks

制定法规的程序 非正式程序 美国联邦绝大部分法规是根据《行政程序法》（Administrative Procedure Act） 第553节所规定的非正式程序制定的。这个程序包括通告、评论、最终法规的公布以及生效日期几个环节。其中最主要的环节是通告和评论。 通告 行政机关必须把他所建议制定的法规草案或其主要内容，在《联邦登记》上公布，供公众了解和评论。 通告的内容包括： 1. 制定建议中的法规的公开程序的时间、地点和性质 2. 制定建议中的法规的法律根据 3. 建议中法规的条款和主要内容，或者说明建议中法规所涉及的对象和问题。 评论 评论是非正式程序中，公众或利害关系人对已经公布的建议法规表示意见的正式渠道，是公众参与制定法规的权利，是非正式程序中必不可少的环节。书面评论是非正式程序中公众参与的主要方式。 公布最终法规 最终法规是行政机关经过评论以后制定的规则，必须在《联邦登记》上公布才能成为正式法规。公布最终法规是非正式程序的最后环节，联邦行政程序法要求在最终法规中必须包括一个序言，简单说明制定法规的根据和目的。序言是行政机关对法规的解释，对行政机关本身具有拘束力，可以作为法院审查法规的根据。如果行政机关在序言中没有指出制定法规的适当根据时，法院可以认为制定法规的程序不合法。 生效日期 最终法规的公布是法规生效的前提，没有公布的法规，对不知情者没有效力。法规一旦公布以后，不是立即发生效力。生效日期和公布日期之间必须有一段间隔的理由，是为了使受法规支配的人有时间可以了解法规，适应法规。 非正式程序的意义 通告和评论的制定法规程序是美国当代行政法上的一个创举，大大加快了美国行政机关立法的发展。行政机关对建议的法规必须公开发表，是行政公开的一种表现，有助于促进行政机关对于制定法规的行为公平考虑。 正式程序 制定法规和行政裁决是两种不同的行政作用，适用不同的程序。正式程序的行政裁决是一种司法化的行政程序，而制定法规依《行政程序法》第553节第3款的规定，原则上采取通告和评论程序，一般情况下无需举行审判型的口头听证程序。行政机关必须采取审判型的听证程序，以听证所认定的事实作为制定法规的唯一根据，这种制定法规的程序是一种司法化的行政程序，类似正式程序的行政裁决。行政机关制定法规是否必须使用正式程序，取决于其他法律是否规定“必须根据听证的记录制定法规”。 根据听证的记录制定法规...

优先股与普通股的利益分配 基于信义义务的制度方法 提要 优先股跨越了股权与债权的边界。股债融合中股权与债权经济利益状态的趋同、组织法与合同法权利行使机制的交叉，带来了股东间复杂的利益竞争。优先股合同权利空间或是被组织挤压，或是在组织中膨胀，合同与组织陷入双重失序。优先股是股不是债，优先股合同权利的边界应在组织法的框架下划定。作为标准的信义义务制度匹配了金融工具创新以及公司法的授权性，其关键在于法官通过何种方法适用模糊的法律标准以及切入复杂的商事交易。通过董事决策程序引导、控制公司决策的公平性，是信义义务司法审查中首要与核心的方法论。结合证明责任的分配机制，优先股与普通股利益分配的公平性也可能通过计算分析和判断。由是，回应股债融合中的利益竞争，提升对信义义务制度的微观适应，一种可能的路径在于: 程序层面，对公司治理中决策过程的认知从法律行为语境下的格式规范进化到商事交易语境下的程序公平; 计算层面，在定量裁判思维下重新认识公司价值计算的意义。 关键词: 优先股 信义义务 商业判断规则 整体公平 司法审查  引言     因应个性化的公司融资与治理需求，以合同手段重新架构公司的利益、风险与控制权分配格局，正在成为我国公司实践中的重要方法。通过合同安排，将股权的各项财产性、治理性子权利分离并重新组合，扩张或限制股权的某些权能，形成了不同于传统普通股的股权或股份类型。作为其中的典型，优先股以分红优先权、清算优先权为核心，并往往伴随在某种条件下回购股权的回赎权、转让股权时强制其他股东一同出售所持有股权的领售权、占据公司一部分董事席位以及针对公司特定事项的一票否决权等优先权利的合同约定。优先权利相对固定了投资者的风险收益，使公司中的一部分股权开始摆脱风险负担、剩余索取的公司法图景，被注入了债权的元素。     优先股合同权利的行使潜藏着合同中的背信弃义与组织中的剥削压制的可能。我国公司法未能对优先股合同权利行使中优先股与普通股的利益竞争问题作出有效回应。比较法上，信义义务制度是处置股东间利益冲突的重要机制，但该制度在我国的移植并不成功。分类表决无法延伸至实质的优先股安排，况且其关乎公司的行动自由，适用范围应该严格限制。异议股东回购请求权在法律解释的层面上应当适用于优先股，同时受制于回购中“合理价格”的计算。股债...

Unocal 测试 1985年特拉华最高法院作出的Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 判决被公认为50年来美国最重要的公司法判决之一。它奠定了此后30年美国公司并购交易的轨迹。 要约收购的限制 美国国会于1968年通过了《威廉姆斯法》（Williams Act），对要约收购加以限制。该法案的主要内容包括：强制要求取得目标公司5%以上股票的个人或团体披露其身份及意图；要约的有效期限不得少于20个工作日；假如要约只收购部分股票，则收购方不得采用先来先得的收购方式，而必须按意愿出售股票的各股东的持股比例收购。 要约收购防御措施的司法审查 商业判断标准（business judgment rule）：法院推定董事会的决定是具有商业合理性的，而要推翻这种推定，必须由原告举证董事会有违诚信，具有欺诈或者没有掌握充分的信息就盲目决断。这一标准非常有利于董事会。 完全公平标准（entire fairness standard）需要由董事会举证其采取的对抗措施非但程序公正（fair dealing），而且确定的对价也公正（fair price）。这样一来，董事会的措施很难得到法院的支持。 Unocal测试（Unocal test）：第一步，对要约收购采取抵抗措施的董事会必须证明“合理相信收购对公司的经营方针及有效的经营活动构成威胁”。为此，董事会要证明采取抵抗措施的主要目的不是为了保住自己的职位，以及其在采取措施之前已经经过调查，掌握了充足的信息。第二步，董事会还需要证明：根据收购具有的威胁程度，其为抵抗收购采取的措施具有合理性。假如董事会能够满足以上两项证明要求，其采取的抵抗收购的措施就将受到商业判断标准的保护。 分两步走的Unocal测试被称为“双叉测试”（two-prong test）.这两支叉分别是：合理相信收购构成威胁，以及对抗措施与威胁成比例。Unocal测试后来成为判断包括“毒丸”在内的收购防御措施是否合法的标准。 Revlon规则是指在出售公司之际，董事会负有为股东们寻求最佳交易方案的义务。

美国行政机关的法规 法规的意义和性质 美国《联邦行政程序法》（Administrative Procedure Act）第551节把行政行为分为两大类：法规（rule）和裁定（order）。裁定是裁决（adjudication）的结果，凡是法规以外的一切最后决定都是裁定。 法规和裁决的区别，类似立法和司法的区别。这种区别，传统上从两个方面观察：以时间为标准和以适用范围为标准。前者以大法官霍姆斯（Justice Holmes）为代表，认为司法的目的是对于现在或过去的事实，按照已经存在的法律进行调查、确认并强制履行其责任。立法着眼于未来，制定新的规则，适用于它管辖范围内的全体人或部分人，以变更现状。后者以首席法官伯格（Chief Justice Burger）为代表，认为法规是对某一广泛集体全体成员普遍适用的规则，裁决是适用于特定的人或情况的决定。 法规的分类 立法性法规是根据法律授权所制定的法规，它具有和法律相同的法律效果。 解释性法规是没有法律授权所制定的法规，它只具有说服力量。 法规的法律效果 实体法法规是根据法律授权规定个人权利和义务的法规。它所产生的法律效果和国会所制定的法律的效果相同。 程序法法规的效力，应区别是否根据法律授权制定而不同。根据法律授权所制定的程序法法规是立法性法规，效力和法律相同，上面所说的各种效果都能适用。没有法律授权所制定的程序法法规，从技术观点而言是解释性法规，效力和解释性法规相同。 解释性法规的效力和立法性法规不同，因为制定解释性法规没有法律的授权，所以这种法规不具有和法律相同的效力。

Liability of corporate officers for securities fraud A corporation or other business entity acts only through its agents, and so a corporation's liability for securities fraud is determined by principles of agency law. In the securities context, two agency-law concepts are relevant: respondeat superior and apparent authority. Under respondeat superior , a "master'' (employer) is liable for the torts of a "servant" (employee) done while the servant is acting within the scope of employment. However, when the servant does not act for the purpose of furthering his master's goals but is on a "frolic of his own," the master is not liable. Under the concept of apparent authority , a principal is liable when an agent acting with apparent authority makes a statement on which another relies.The agent has apparent authority when, from the perspective of third parties, it appears that the corporation has vested the agent with authority to make the statemen...

The Revlon rule is the legal principle that a company's board of directors make a reasonable effort to obtain the highest value for a company when a hostile takeover is imminent. The Revlon rule involves a narrower interpretation of a board's fiduciary duty, which typically is limited to protecting a company from external threats; under normal conditions, a director is not required to negotiate with any hostile bidder. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. William Allen believed that the dealing between Time and Warner did not constitute selling Time, because the control of the company is still in the broad, liquid and changing market after the dealing. In other words, the control of Time was still dispersed. Under Revlon doctrince, when evaluating a sale of a company or the transfer of its control, a court will defer to enhanced judicial scrutiny, rather than a business judgement rule, and a board's fiduciary duty will shift from a duty to preserve the corporat...

The Revlon rule is the legal principle that a company's board of directors make a reasonable effort to obtain the highest value for a company when a hostile takeover is imminent. The Revlon rule involves a narrower interpretation of a board's fiduciary duty, which typically is limited to protecting a company from external threats; under normal conditions, a director is not required to negotiate with any hostile bidder. In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc. William Allen believed that the dealing between Time and Warner did not constitute selling Time, because the control of the company is still in the broad, liquid and changing market after the dealing. In other words, the control of Time was still dispersed. Under Revlon doctrince, when evaluating a sale of a company or the transfer of its control, a court will defer to enhanced judicial scrutiny, rather than a business judgement rule, and a board's fiduciary duty will shift from a duty to preserve the corporat...

Case 1: In re Appraisal of Dell Inc. On August 14, 2012, Michael Dell, the president of Dell   On August 14, 2012, Mr. Dell first informed the chief independent director of the company's board of directors that he was preparing his going private. 'The board of directors immediately held a plenary meeting on August 17th to hear Mr. Dell's formal report and a meeting again on August 2 to set up a special committee Going private procedures Case 2: In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litigation Case 3: Chinese Concepts Stocks With poor protection of Cayman Islands Company Law for public investors, many companies of China choose to register in Cayman Islands.

Disclosure for Going Private Transactions Fedaral securities laws impose some disclosure requirements for going private transactions. As a matter of law, directors of a target company are required to disclose all relavent information to public stockholders to make sure that these stockholders can make informed decision to approve or reject the going private transaction. Then, SEC has established rules that particular information must be included in the public disclosure for a going private transaction. Apart for the same filling disclosure as any other acquisiton acquisition transactions, a going private transaction also requires disclosure requirement of Rule 13e-3 of the Exchange Act. the basic disclosure required by SEC rules depend in apart on the structure of the transaction. For a transaction structured as one-step merger, the target company must solicit approve of its stockholders with a proxy statement complying with Regulation 14A and Regulation 14C under the Exchange Act. ...

Structure for Going Private Transaction Like any other acquisition of public companies, a going private transaction is generally accomplished in one of the two ways: One-step merger tender offer followed by a back-end merger (known as a two-step merger ) Besides, whether a going private transaction involve a controlling stockholder affect the structure of the transaction. A going private transaction by a controlling stockholder creates an inherent conflict of interest . The controlling stockholder seeks to acquire entire ownership of the target company, while it owes fiduciary duty to minority stockholders. If a lawsuit challenging a going private transaction by a controlling stockholder, thus, is filed, a Delaware court will apply the stringent entire fairness standard of review . A going private transaction may also involve an acquisition of a public company by a non-controlling stockholder or a leveraged buyout of a public company by a private equity firm or other third-party acqu...

Litigation under Going Private Transactions There are two types of going private lawsuits. The one is brought by an acquiror against certain takeover defensive measures implemented by a company"s board of directors. For example, the acquiror may request the reviewing court to prevent the board from implementing any defensive measures, or seek mandatory redemption of poision pills by the board. The key legal issue is whether certain defensive measures implemented by Unocal test in Unocal v. Mesa , the board meet the standard of fiduciary duty established by Delaware courts.  The another is brought by stockholders of a target company, based on three reasons. The first, public investors can file complaints against board of directors based on claims of breach of fiduciary duties of them. In these cases, investors may claim that directors breach their fiduciary duties in the name of the company, commonly referred to as "derivative action". Although directors have formall...

US Going Private Transaction Key issue For going private transactions, the most important legal issue is to make sure that a controlling stockholder and corporate executives of a target company protect interests of public investors of the company though this going private transaction. Advantages Permiting a controlling stockholder and its publicly traded subsidiary to integrate their operations more efficiently and effectively, without concerns for fairness to other stockholders. Allowing the board of directors to focus on long-term objectives rather than short-term profits to meet the expection. Permiting the public stockholders to realize a better price for their shares than they would realize from continuing to hold the shares or selling in the market, perhaps due to low trading volumes, or lack of any other buyer. In the case of a leveraged buyout, allowing the acquiror and the target company to realize the tax benefits of a more leveraged capital structure than would be acceptable...

Key issue For going private transactions, the most important legal issue is to make sure that a controlling stockholder and corporate executives of a target company protect interests of public investors of the company though this going private transaction. Advantages Permiting a controlling stockholder and its publicly traded subsidiary to integrate their operations more efficiently and effectively, without concerns for fairness to other stockholders. Allowing the board of directors to focus on long-term objectives rather than short-term profits to meet the expection. Permiting the public stockholders to realize a better price for their shares than they would realize from continuing to hold the shares or selling in the market, perhaps due to low trading volumes, or lack of any other buyer. In the case of a leveraged buyout, allowing the acquiror and the target company to realize the tax benefits of a more leveraged capital structure than would be acceptable for the target as a public c...

Defensive Tactics for Corporate Control Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.: Unocal Test Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. is a landmark decision of  the Delaware Supreme Court on corporate defensive tactics against take-over bids. As a trial court, Delaware Court of Chancery found that this selective exchange offer was not legally permissible, and issued a preliminary injunction against the use of the self tender offer defense. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the Unocal's board of directors had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy or effectiveness existed and that the response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This reasonable relation analysis permitted an analysis of the nature, price and time of the offer as well as the impact on shareholders, creditors, customers and employees. The Unocal test the court established to determine whether the directors may try to prevent a take o...

Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. is a landmark decision of  the Delaware Supreme Court on corporate defensive tactics against take-over bids. As a trial court, Delaware Court of Chancery found that this selective exchange offer was not legally permissible, and issued a preliminary injunction against the use of the self tender offer defense. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the trial court. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the Unocal's board of directors had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy or effectiveness existed and that the response was reasonable in relation to the threat posed. This reasonable relation analysis permitted an analysis of the nature, price and time of the offer as well as the impact on shareholders, creditors, customers and employees. The Unocal test the court established to determine whether the directors may try to prevent a take over is a two pronged test. The two prongs include: First, did the directors reasonably p...